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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Watson v. Feibel,12 when, after defending the doctrine of default
from the assaults of its many critics, it added:
"But if putting in default were to be wrenched from its
proper function of giving warning in order that the debtor
may perform, and converted into an instrument for destroy-
ing the right to perform, it would deserve, and richly so,
this severe arraignment of it.' 3
It may be argued that default has no place whatsoever in
compensatory damage suits,14 but this is not necessary in order to
avoid the inequities resulting from an overzealous application of
Article 1913. A restriction of that article to cases involving
moratory damages would accomplish the same thing without
injury to our code or jurisprudence. The courts would then be
free to exercise the control given them in Article 2047 and decide
whether or not to allow the party in default additional time for
performance according to the materiality of the delay in the
light of the nature of the contract and the attendant circum-
stances.
Jerry Simon
PRESCRIPTION OF JOINT MINERAL LEASES-INTERRUPTION
Plaintiff brought a concursus proceeding to determine the
rights of the several defendants to royalties from the plaintiff's
well. Defendant Davis owned a forty acre tract of land. Defen-
dant George and defendant Oil Investment, Incorporated, each
owned a one-quarter interest in the mineral rights of this land.
Plaintiff secured voluntary pooling or unitization agreements for
exploration purposes from the owners of the entire section in
which Davis' land lay.' The defendant Davis in signing one of
the agreements specifically deleted a paragraph which stated that
any drilling on any part of the pooled land would constitute an
interruption of prescription of ten years liberandi causa and that
any payment of royalties would be considered as a new acknowl-
edgment made for the purpose of interrupting prescription. Held,
12. 139 La. 375, 71 So. 585 (1916).
13. 139 La. 375, 390, 71 So. 585, 590.
14. This is the view taken by many French commentators. Hubert, S.
1926.1.17, Planol, S. 92.1.117, 2 Colin et Capitant, Droit Civil Francais, § 99
(1945).
1. The effects of a forced pooling agreement are beyond the scope of
this note.
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the purposes and intention of the defendant Davis in striking out
this paragraph was to deny the interruption of prescription and
to refuse any acknowledgment thereof. Placid Oil Company v.
George, 49 So. 2d 500 (La. App. 1950).
In cases concerning joint leases the supreme court has held
that the intention of the landowner governs.2 In applying Article
35203 to mineral servitudes, it has consistently decided that, to be
sufficient to interrupt the running of prescription, an acknowl-
edgment must be express; it must indicate with certainty the
intent of the landowner.4 A bare acknowledgment of the rights
of another party will not suffice. 5
The first case dealing with a joint lease was Mulhern v.
Hayne,6 where the court unfortunately said that a joint lease
extending beyond the prescriptive period would interrupt pre-
scription. However, this holding was explained in Bremer v.
North Central Texas Oil Company,7 as standing for nothing more
than the prolongation of the prescriptive period in order to make
the joint lease valid for the length of time it goes beyond the
original term of the servitude. In Baker v. Wilder,8 the court,
further clarified its position by holding that in the Mulhern case
it was speaking in terms of extension rather than interruption.
As the matter now stands the signing of a joint lease, the
term of which does not extend beyond the prescriptive period,
does not of itself show the intention of the landowner to extend
the term of the servitude.9 But, if the primary term of the lease
2. Bremer v. North Central Texas Oil Co., Inc., 185 La. 917, 171 So. 75
(1936); Achee v. Caillouet, 197 La. 313, 1 So. 2d 530 (1941); Spears v. Nesbitt,
197 La. 931, 2 So. 2d 650 (1941).
3. Art. 3520, La. Civil Code of 1870: "Prescription ceases likewise to run
whenever the debtor, or possessor, makes acknowledgment of the right of the
person whose title they prescribed."
4. Vincent v. Bullock, 192 La. 1, 187 So. 35 (1939); Goree v. Sanders, 203
La. 859, 14 So. 2d 744 (1943).
5. This rule was well stated in Louisiana Del Oil Properties, Inc. v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 169 La. 1137, 1142, 126 So. 684, 686 (1930), where the
supreme court said: "In construing this article [3520], the Supreme Court of
this state has held repeatedly that 'the acknowledgment, in order to interrupt
prescription, must be specific;' that 'unless the acknowledgment be clear and
precise, the courts cannot consider it;' and that 'a simple recognition neither
disposes of nor changes the state of the thing!'"
6. 171 La. 1003, 132 So. 659 (1931).
7. 185 La. 917, 171 So. 75 (1936).
8. 204 La. 759, 16' So. 2d 346 (1943).
9. Bremer v. North Central Texas Oil Co., 185 La. 917, 171 So. 75 (1936);
Cox v. Acme Land & Investment Co., 192 La. 688, 188 So. 742 (1939).
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does expire on a date beyond the end of the ten-year prescriptive
period, the term of the servitude will be extended. 10
The drafters of the agreement in the principal case were well
aware of the latest expressions of the court holding that the
signing of a joint lease of itself would not serve to interrupt
prescription and attempted to establish a clear-cut interruption
by contract. The defendant Davis, being equally well advised,
struck out this clause, thereby showing a clear intention not to
allow the interruption of prescription.
The court said that if the defendant Davis had not struck
out this paragraph there would have been an express interrup-
tion, "and it is equally as obvious that the purposes and inten-
tion of these parties in striking out the provisions of this para-
graph was in effect to deny the interruption of prescription and
to refuse any acknowledgment thereof."
The instant case shows the hesitancy of the courts to allow
an interruption of prescription unless there is a clear intention
to do so. This seems to be a wise policy in view of the fact that
no new consideration need be given when there is an interruption
of prescription by acknowledgment.' 2
Arthur E. Sparling
OBLIGATIONS-EXCLUSIVE LISTING AGREEMENTS-
POTESTATIVE CONDITIONS
Under terms of an exclusive listing contract, defendant, an
owner of real estate, on December 7, 1949, listed for sale certain
property with plaintiffs, real estate brokers. Defendant agreed to
pay plaintiffs a commission whether the property was sold by
plaintiffs, by defendant or by any other person or persons. There-
after, about December 27, 1949, defendant requested the return
of his listing, advising plaintiffs that he no longer wished to sell
the property. The listing was surrendered with the understand-
ing that if defendant desired to sell the property within sixty
days he would relist the same with plaintiffs. The property was
nevertheless sold by defendant on January 6, 1950, to a purchaser
10. Achee v. Caillouet, 197 La. 313, 1 So. 2d 530 (1941) and White v.
Hodges, 201 La. 1, 9 So. 2d 433 (1942).
11. Placid Oil Co. v. George, 49 So. 2d 500, 505 (La. App. 1950).
12. For a discussion of this point, see Daggett, Mineral Rights in Loui-
siana 73-74 (1949).
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